Introduction
In the past decade, the European Union (EU) has taken an active role in counter-terrorism. It has adopted a broad range of measures, including a comprehensive European Union Counter-Terrorist Strategy as well as a common definition of what is a 'terrorist offence'. 1 Amongst the EU's counter-terrorist policies, sanctions (asset freezing) remain the cornerstone. The EU runs two different regimes of counter-terrorist sanctions: autonomous EU sanctions 2 and EU sanctions implementing UN lists of terrorist suspects. 3 The latter became very well known in EU law circles through the abundant discussion of the case of Kadi. 4 The former have all the relevant information, while in the case of sanctions giving effect to UN lists the information appears simply not accessible, either for the EU or its Member States.
Hence, even though both types of sanctions are adopted in a similar secretive manner and even though both types of sanctions are equally invasive when it comes to human rights, under the autonomous listing procedure the EU should have the means and the relevant information to adopt counter-terrorist sanctions lawfully -if that is possible. This paper focuses on the problems resulting from the current treatment of sensitive information under the composite procedure leading to the adoption of autonomous EU counter-terrorist sanctions. It explores how substantive judicial review could be offered while ensuring the confidentiality of certain information.
The paper is structured as follows. Section Two introduces the autonomous listing procedure and examines the treatment of sensitive information under this procedure. The Council's inability or unwillingness to share information with the EU judiciary and with those sanctioned is the main reason for the procedural flaws that have led time and again to the annulment of autonomous EU sanctions. The core question that arises from the discussion and that connects Section Two with the following Section Three is whether the Council is or should be obliged to share with the EU Courts all the relevant information that constitutes the basis of the listing decision. Section Three turns to the Council's attempt to justify the refusal to share information with a reference to classification under national law. It discusses inter alia the 'originator controls' principle. Sharing information is a basic requirement for cooperation between the EU and its Member States. If Member States are unable to exclude further dissemination of information that they make available to the EU institution, this might negatively affect their willingness to share that information.
Section Four examines potential procedural mechanisms that might allow the Court of Justice to consider sensitive information, on which the sanction is based while at the same time ensuring the applicant's rights to a fair trial. The very last section brings together the conclusions.
Adopting Autonomous EU Sanctions in Secret?

Information Flow Under the Adoption Procedure
Under the autonomous EU regime of counter-terrorist sanctions suspects are listed pursuant to a composite procedure set out in Common Position 931/2001/CFSP. 5 The composite listing procedure takes place in two phases. First at the national level, a 'competent national authority' takes a 'decision' within the meaning of Article 1(4) of Common Position 2001/931/CFSP. The 'competent national authority' should in principle be a judicial authority but often is not. 6 The 'decision' must entail that the individual is a terrorist suspect. Second, the Council decides to sanction an individual or organisation on the basis of the 'precise information or material in the relevant file', which indicates that a decision has been taken at the national level. 7 The sanction is then imposed on those listed in a directly General Court in the case of Al Aqsa. 15 The General Court had held that an order of a national court hearing the application for interim measures could no longer serve as the basis for a listing after the 2003 Netherlands regulation on sanctions for the suppression of terrorism 16 Indeed, judging from the case law this appears to be common practice. In this light, the principle of separation of powers does not stand in the way of a substantive assessment. On the contrary, the additional adverse effects that a listing in an autonomous EU list of terrorist suspects imposes on individuals 26 warrant that the Council checks that the requirements for a listing are met at the EU level. This must include that the relevant information provided sufficiently supports the assessment that the person is a terrorist suspect.
Both the General Court 27 and the Court of Justice 28 ruled that there is a distinction between the initial listing decision and subsequent listing decisions. The 21 Council document 10826/07 (n 9 above), Annex II, paras. 13-14. 22 Council document 10826/07 (n 8 above), Annex II, para. 4 (emphasis added). verification by the Council of a decision by a national authority for the adoption of the initial decision to freeze funds is an essential precondition. After the initial sanctioning decision, the Council must ensure at least every six months that there are sufficient grounds for keeping an organisation on the list. 29 The General Court ruled in Sofiane Fahas that the verification the consequences of the national decision is ´imperative in the context of the adoption of a subsequent decision to freeze funds.' 30 At the same time, the Council remains obliged 'to defer as far as possible to the assessment conducted by the competent national authority, at least where it is a judicial authority […] . 31 In the Al Aqsa case, the General Court ruled that when at national level police or security enquiries are closed without giving rise to any judicial consequences, the Council is bound to take that into account. 32 
Failure to Disclose Relevant Information
The General Court has repeatedly annulled sanctions decisions of the Council. 37 The core problem is the Council's failure to disclose the relevant information to the judiciary and to those sanctioned.
Most recently, the failure to disclose relevant information was demonstrated in the appeal case of France v PMOI. 38 The PMOI was subject of a subsequent listing, . 38 Case C-27/09 P France v OMPI/PMOI (n 28 above). 39 Case C-27/09 P France v OMPI/PMOI (n 28 above), para. 62. 40 Case C-27/09 P France v OMPI/PMOI (n 28 above), para. 40.
was not provided to PMOI. 41 The Council further informed the Court 'that it was unable to produce, at that stage, certain further documents setting out the proposed new basis for listing PMOI and explaining the reasons for its proposal, since these All documents were considered by the General Court as insufficient to support the Council's contention. 45 The obstacle to informing the EU institutions of all the evidence lay in French national law. Further evidence relating to the judicial inquiry 'must, under French law, remain confidential during the course of the inquiry.' 46 As a consequence, the Council did not receive all the evidence either. The
Council was not informed of the identity of the alleged members of PMOI that were under investigation in France. Nor was the Council informed about the future steps of the inquiry'. 47 The General Court specifically related the lack of information to the 41 Case C-27/09 P France v OMPI/PMOI (n 28 above), para. 41. 42 Case C-27/09 P France v OMPI/PMOI (n 28 above), para. 42. 43 Case T-284/08 OMPI/PMOI III (n 34 above), para. 72. 44 Case T-284/08 OMPI/PMOI III (n 34 above), para. 73. 45 Case T-284/08 OMPI/PMOI III (n 34 above). 46 See para. 11 of the Council's first response to the court order of 26 September 2008, at para. 58 of AG Sharpston, Opinion in C-27/09 P France v OMPI/PMOI (n 14 above). 47 Ibid. The legal regime on classified information should be contrasted with the transparency regulation, which aims to give the fullest possible effect to the right of public access to documents held by an institution, including not only documents drawn up by an institution but also documents received from third parties, including the Member States (expressly stated in Article 3(b)). Article 4(4) of the latter extends access to documents originating with third parties. It sets out: 'As regards third-party documents, the institution shall consult the third party with a view to assessing whether an exception in paragraph 1 or 2 is applicable, unless it is clear that the document shall or shall not be disclosed.' The latter should be read as a reference to classified information. Yet, it applies to 'third parties' and hence not to Member '-meetings will be held in a secured environment so as to enable discussion up to SECRET UE, and will be held as and when necessary; communicated to the other parties.' 76 The rules only address the specific point of limiting the access of interveners to 'secret or confidential documents'. 77 The obvious places to look for inspiration are national legal systems.
Particularly in the UK, discussion has recently focussed on the treatment of sensitive information in courts. 78 One option, currently under discussion in the UK for civil procedures, could be closed material procedures. 79 However, it is in order to start with the clarification that the following examination aims to evaluate and assess the implications of the closed material procedures without presupposing that such measures are necessary in all legal challenges against sanctions. 80 National procedural mechanism should not be blindly copied but must be carefully examined as to their consequences on fair trial.
Closed material procedure can be divided into two stages. A key procedural component is the use of special advocates with high security clearance, who are given access to sensitive information that will not be disclosed to those whom these advocates represent (in line with the terminology of the EU Courts this would be the applicant). At the first stage, the decision must be made whether the material is indeed confidential and cannot be revealed to the applicant. The claim of necessary http://www.officialdocuments.gov.uk/document/cm81/8194/8194.pdf. 79 UK Government Green Paper (n 77 above); consider also the existing procedures in the Special Immigration Appeals Commission. 80 The argument that discussing the details of the closed materials procedure presupposes the acceptance of the need for secrecy was eloquently made by: Murphy, 2011. access all relevant information, including the confidential part that is not provided to the applicant. In this procedure it is necessary for the special advocate to communicate with the applicant not only before but also after he or she has reviewed the confidential material. The latter requires the special advocate to make an assessment about how much of the confidential information (and in what detail) he or she can discuss with the applicant. This might appear to place too much responsibility on the special advocate. However, first of all, strict rules should apply at the first stage that ensure that only the absolute minimum of sensitive information stays secret in the first place. This information can also be revealed to the special advocate with explicit instructions what could be discussed with the applicant.
Second, we should not think of special advocates as ordinary lawyers. They should be highly screened and trained individuals that are employed by and responsible to public authority (the EU) for contesting the 'prosecution' and arguing for the side of the applicant. They should not be dependent on the applicant. Finally, the Court of Justice would possibly have to render part of its ruling in secret. The latter entails further difficulties concerning the transparency of judicial dialogue, the accountability of the judiciary, and the ability of future parties to argue their case. In any event, a summary of the reasons and the ruling must be available both to the applicant and to the general public. 81 The Court of Justice has an inquisitorial role also in ordinary proceedings. This should be emphasized in closed evidence procedures. Beyond this it would be desirable that judges are given training on how to handle sensitive information, evaluate disclosure decisions, and give closed judgment.
In order to make use of a closed material procedure at the EU level, it would be indispensible to establish a sophisticated legal framework that reasons on the basis of a general presumption that all information is open and accessible and sets out minimum rules on communication with the applicant, support of the special advocate, and minimum openness requirements. If these standards cannot be met public action against any 'terrorist suspect' must be excluded. Any exception from the general presumption of openness would have to be specifically justified and compatible with EU law. The difficulties arising from a closed material procedure would have to be studied in detail and rules to anticipate any illegitimate restrictions would have to be put in place. The legal framework would have to ensure as a 81 See on the summary: UK Government Green Paper (n 78 above), p 69. minimum that the standards required by the ECHR as interpreted by the ECtHR are met despite the fact that (part of the) relevant information is not shared with the applicant. Interesting in this context is the ruling of the ECtHR in the case of A and Others v UK. 82 Although A and Others concerned preventive detention and therefore dealt with the special provision of Article 5(4) ECHR, 83 the case is a recent illustrative example of the requirements that the ECtHR imposes on the use of confidential information in court proceedings. The Court referred to its own case law concerning the right to a fair trial and explained that it was significant that the trial judge had 'full knowledge of the issues in the trial' and can 'carr[y] out the balancing exercise and that steps had been taken to ensure that the defence were kept informed and permitted to make submissions and participate in the decision-making process as far as was possible without disclosing the material which the prosecution sought to keep secret'. 84 The Court explained that competing public interest can restrict the rights of the defendant; yet if the defendant 'has had no opportunity to examine or to have examined […] the rights of the defence would be restricted to an extent incompatible with the guarantees provided by Article 6 ECHR. 85 The Strasbourg Court, while it had referred to special advocates in earlier rulings, endorsed in A and Others for the first time 'the possibility of using special advocates to counterbalance procedural unfairness caused by lack of full disclosure […] .' 86 It came to the conclusion that in the cases of five of the applicants 87 Article 5(4) ECHR had not been violated because 'the special advocate could provide an important, additional safeguard though questioning the State's witnesses on the need for secrecy and through making submissions to the judge regarding the case for additional disclosure.' 88 ' [T]he special advocate could perform an important role in counterbalancing the lack of full disclosure and the lack of a full, open, adversarial hearing by testing the evidence and putting arguments on behalf of the detainee during the closed hearings.' 89 The ECtHR found a violation of Article 5(4) ECHR in the case of four applicants because they did not have contact with the special advocate after she had seen the confidential material and because the open allegations (that the applicants had seen) were too general in nature to allow them to provide the special advocate with information to effectively challenge the charges. 90 Autonomous EU counter-terrorist sanctions differ from preventative detention. However, open-ended asset freezes that last for more than a decade impose so far-reaching human rights restrictions that their 'preventative' or 'administrative' nature is widely questioned. 91 Yet so far neither the Court of Justice nor the ECtHR has settled whether they should be considered of a criminal nature.
Even though the criminal nature of autonomous EU sanctions is not uncontroversial it is desirable that the legal framework provides for procedural safeguards that meet the required level of Article 6 ECHR for proceedings determining a criminal charge.
Not only would this place the EU on the safe side in the event of a future determination that indeed counter-terrorist sanctions are a criminal charge. It would also contribute to the trust and confidence of EU citizens in the Union's commitment to the rule of law. It is worth recalling: In the UK, special advocates originate in immigration proceedings. 92 More recently, they have been used in counter-terrorist procedures. 93 The UK Government in its Justice and Security Green Paper discusses the transfer to criminal law. 94 They have not actually been used in criminal procedures.
Conclusions
The effective sharing of information between the EU and its Member States is crucial to the quality of the decisions under the autonomous EU sanctions procedure where the Council lists a person as a terrorist based on the decision of a competent national authority. The Council cannot simply rubberstamp a national decision that someone is a terrorist without independently assessing the situation. This can be supported by three observations. First, the national decision is taken in a completely different procedure that culminates in a different outcome (e.g. conviction for a crime under national law as opposed to the freezing of assets). Second, the Council exercises discretion when it takes the listing decision. Discretion implies assessment.
Hence, the Council cannot exercise discretion without having a basis for assessment.
Third, the Council's decision to list someone as terrorist and freeze that person's assets might be reviewed in court. Indeed, a large number of legal actions against different types of sanctions, including autonomous counter-terrorist sanctions are pending. In the event of a judicial challenge, the Court will not accept to be kept out of the loop. National classification as confidential will not be enough to refuse informing the Court. 95 Finally, there is a public dimension that should not be underestimated in the EU context. EU citizens must be able to have confidence that the EU institutions and bodies do not act outside of the law but that they are subject to independent judicial scrutiny. The EU must not only be a Union of law but also be able to rely on the trust and confidence of its citizens that this is the case. It is risky for the EU project to enter into contentious areas of restrictive policy-making, such as counter-terrorism and the prevention of crime, if this public confidence is not ensured. The EU is in this regard in a special place. It does not possess either the same 'natural' legitimacy to impose human rights restrictions or the same enforcement mechanisms as a state. Indeed, the Union's case to argue that it is a Union of law is more difficult and should be made with great care -even avoiding the appearance of arbitrariness.
Setting up a legal framework that enables the Council to list individuals based on confidential information without infringing the applicant's procedural rights does not appear impossible -even in the light of the far-reaching human rights restrictions imposed by counter-terrorist sanctions. A closed materials procedure would require a clear set of rules for the disclosure process, including rules on the participation of a trained special advocate not only in the main proceedings but also in the disclosure process, rules on the communication between the special advocate and the applicant (in particular after the former has seen the closed material), and rules on giving -if necessary -even a partially closed judgment. The disclosure rules would have to start from the basic assumption that all material is open to the applicant and that any exception to this assumption must be justified to the EU Courts within the framework of EU law.
Arguing the case for closed material procedures at the EU level is a difficult one. It accepts the necessity of an exceptional need for secrecy under the autonomous sanctions procedure. However, the need for a careful case-by-case assessment of whether some of the relevant information cannot be revealed to the applicant can be argued. There should be an option to consider closed material procedures. In an area as sensitive as counter-terrorism this might be the only way to ensure Member State's willingness to share information. Particularly, if they are not permitted to simply exclude any access at all by classifying the information before providing it to the Council -and they should not be. Only if comprehensive information is provided to the Council the quality of sanctions decisions can be ensured. The same is true for the Court. Only, if the Court of Justice is in the position to consider comprehensively all relevant information it is in the position to render a well-founded decision. The issue of whether those sanctioned can be allowed to access all relevant information is a separate matter and should be considered separately. As a general rule, individuals who are subject to public decisions that (may) have adverse effects on their legal position have the right to be heard during the administrative procedure and the right to challenge such decision in court. For the exercise of both rights access to the relevant information that has led to the decision of the public authority is of the essence. Only if the affected person is confronted with the allegations he or she can effectively rebut these allegations. Only then the applicant is able to actively participate in the judicial proceedings rather than being made subject to the proceedings. A careful and differentiated approach to a strictly limited need for secrecy might make a greater contribution to individual rights than a blunt claim for total transparency -particularly in the complex interaction between EU institutions and Member States in the autonomous sanctions procedure.
